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THE SHERMAN ACT § I PER SE-
THERE OUGHT TO BE A BETTER WAY
by
William I. Flittie*
O RIGINALLY it was planned to cover in a single Article both criticism of
the Sherman Act § 1 per se concept, and an alternative to the per se con-
cept which would be less destructive of the true goals of antitrust. The criti-
cism segment, however, has proved more lengthy ,than anticipated. Inasmuch
as the complete study breaks cleanly into these two subjects, this Article will
present only the criticism of the per se concept. A second Article, which
develops an alternative to the per se concept, is proposed for the coming
year. This second Article will be concerned primarily with how expeditious
record making procedures may be designed to deliver antitrust cases tried on
the merits from the morass of the many essentially false adversary contests in
which they are trapped. If the evidentiary conflict is reduced to what really
is in issue, per se shortcuts, which flout individual case merits, may become
unnecessary.
I. HAS A MEANS BECOME AN END?
This Article is concerned with the methods whereby the multi-party
restraints of trade forbidden by Sherman Act § 11 are classed reasonable,
and thus legal, or unreasonable, and thus forbidden. Two methods of
inquiry are used: the per se rules and the rule of reason. 2 Either might
* B.Sc., University of Minnesota; LL.B., Columbia University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University. The author wishes to acknowledge the considerable
assistance of Patricia A. Stevenson, third-year student, Southern Methodist University
School of Law, in the preparation of this Article.
1. The Sherman Act is the Act of July 2, 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). Sher-
man Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), states: "Every contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to
be illegal .... ." This section can be violated only by agreement of multiple parties;
it takes at least two to conspire, combine, or contract. United States v. Empire Gas
Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1975). Direct price fixing, the normal, neces-
sary and entirely legal function of every proprietor, becomes the most obvious of Sher-
man Act § 1 violations when arrived at through agreement of two or more parties.
2. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). In Carter-Wal-
lace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1971), this description of the
two methods appears:
Conduct which can conceivably violate the Sherman Act may be examined
in terms of three basic variables: (1) its economic effects, positive (fur-
thering efficient performance of economic functions) and negative (anti-
competitive impact on the free play of market forces); (2) the power of
the parties in the markets which they serve; and (3) the motives under-
lying the conduct. A full rule-of-reason standard requires scrutiny of all
three variables before a judgment is reached that a given practice is "rea-
sonable" (permissible under the Act) or "unreasonable" (proscribed). A
rule-of-reason inquiry may also eliminate examination of one or more
elements, so that, for instance, anti-competitive effect will be assessed but
motive excluded as immaterial.
At the other end of the spectrum from the full rule-of-reason test is the
strict per se rule, which characterizes the mere existence of a practice as a
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produce the same result, but there is a vital distinction. Applied literally the
per se concept must produce illegality, whereas rule of reason inquiry only
may so result.8
As will be seen in succeeding sections, the per se concepts, in some of their
applications, have become so eroded, or from inception were always so
compromised in definition, that they verge into what better might be called
limited rule of reason inquiry. Nevertheless, there remains a tension to be
grasped-the conflict between those who believe there should be more
liberal inquiry through placing challenged practices in the context of their
business environments, 4 and those who favor enlarging the situations where
such inquiry is denied. 5
To get an obvious example of the per se concept before us, consider direct
price fixing among competitors. This is the purest of the per se concepts and
also the one concerning which there is the least dispute as to propriety of
condemnation upon mere identification. 6 That is to say, once it is shown an
agreement to fix prices exists, the violation is complete. All that remains to
contest is appropriate relief. In civil cases the relief contest is in terms of the
content of injunctive decrees or extent of monetary damages. In criminal
cases once guilt has been found it is in terms of the criminal sentence to be
exacted for the violation.7
It may be concluded that the creep of the law has favored expansion of
the per se concept since its initial 1927 appearance.8 But now, half a
century later, a case has been decided which should give pause to proponents
as well as opponents of the per se concept, at least to the extent of
reexamination of this purely Supreme Court-made doctrine. In United
violation of the Act, rendering irrelevant further inquiry into the actual
circumstances and effect. Such a rule establishes a conclusive presump-
tion that a kind of action has improper anticompetitive effects, a presump-
tion which governs regardless of whether the particular conduct in its ac-
tual context has been proved to have those consequences.
3. Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 AM. ECON.
REV. 471, 473-81 (1956).
4. M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 26-28 (1974); A. PHILLIPS, MARKET
STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 23141 (1962); Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divisions, 74 YALE L.J. 775
(1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competi-
tion Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 298-99 (1975).
5. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 165-66 (1959); C. KAYSEN &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 142-44 (1959); Rahl, Price Competition and the Price
Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 14849 (1962). In ad-
dition, Rahl argues all inquiry is rule-of-reason inquiry, but inquiry reasonably stops
upon identification of the per se category of price fixing. Id. at 139-40. This only can
be a play with words making for confusion of what is a useful labeling dichotomy that
describes two quite different methods of trying antitrust cases. The weight of recent
Supreme Court majorities falls with those favoring increased ascendancy of the per se
concept. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
6. However, even in the category of price fixing questions are being raised by dis-
tinguished authorities as to the desirability of per se rigidities. See Bork, supra note
4, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 776, 782 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 474 (1966); Elman, "Petrified
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1966).
7. Query as to whether evidence of reasonableness should be heard in a criminal
per se case. It is the role of the jury in criminal trials, which may refuse to find guilt
despite what would be a directed verdict situation in a corresponding civil case, that
raises the problem.
8. See notes 3-6 supra. For emergence of the per se concept see part II infra.
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States v. Topco Associates, Inc.9 a cooperative corporation, Topco Asso-
ciates, Inc., had been organized to serve some twenty-five small and
medium-sized regional supermarket chains. The combined sales of the
twenty-five were less than the individual sales of any one of the three
supermarket chain giants: A&P, Safeway, and Kroger. The significant
activity challenged in this litigation was the use by the twenty-five of their
Topco Associates creature to procure for themselves numerous staple items
of grocery stock (canned goods, paper goods, etc.) bearing various Topco
private brand labels. The purpose of the twenty-five parents was to develop
respected, private branded items of merchandise in order to compete more
effectively with the private branded products of the giant chains. To protect
their shared Topco brands from falling into hands that might use them in a
fashion damaging to a reputation acquired through costly promotions and
quality controls10 (and undoubtedly also to keep for themselves such
business advantage as exclusive rights to Topco branded merchandise con-
ferred) the Topco twenty-five, through the vehicle of their corporation,
effectively restricted each to an exclusive territory in which a particular one
of the twenty-five was the only seller having access to Topco branded
products. There was no attempt or purpose to fix resale prices,"'
The trial court upheld the arrangement, finding the admittedly anticompe-
titive intra-brand restraint was far outweighed at the more important inter-
brand level "by the increased ability of Topco members to compete both
with the national chains and other supermarkets operating in their respective
territories."'1 2 Almost any grocery shopper acquainted with this background
would have pronounced the trial court's finding eminently sensible, and
nowhere in its opinion does the Supreme Court majority contest the net
competitive advantage found by the court below. Instead, the majority,
speaking through Mr. Justice Marshall, reviewed the development of the per
se concept and concluded, somewhat unconvincingly, that horizontal territo-
rial restrictions already had been classed per se violations in a 1967 case.' s
9. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
10. A particularly damaging competition would be that of a Topco associate that
had outgrown the need for the shared brand and developed its own private brand. Ap-
parently there was provision to oust and replace such associates. Id. at 624 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
11. There also were wholesaling restrictions that were stricken down as per se viola-
tions. Id. at 612. These are little described and do not merit particular inquiry here.
The harshest test for per se condemnation is presented in terms of the retailing restric-
tions. Further, it is quite evident the wholesaling restrictions were further to assure ter-
ritorial exclusivity at the retail level.
12. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1043 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
13. 405 U.S. at 609, citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). But
Sealy is heavily tainted with the per se violation of price fixing. Indeed, the Topco
opinion concedes, by footnote, that Topco well may be the first true per se disposition
of horizontal territorial restrictions. 405 U.S. at 609 n.9. Given this doubt the Court,
having the business context facts before it, surely should have made an evaluation on
the merits, as it says it always does before pronouncing a per se category. White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). Of course, had the Court done so,
the result probably would have been opposite, and per se condemnation of horizontal
territorial restrictions at least would have been deferred to a future case. Chief Justice
Burger dissented sharply from the proposition that horizontal territorial restraints al-
ready had been classified per se violations, demonstrating that the case authorities that
were relied upon by the majority were tainted with clear per se violations in already
19761
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This was held to preclude rule of reason inquiry into the challenged practice.
The opinion states:
The District Court determined that by limiting the freedom of its indi-
vidual members to compete with each other, Topco was doing a greater
good by fostering competition between members and other large super-
market chains. But, the fallacy in this is that Topco has no authority
under the Sherman Act to determine the respective values of competi-
tion in various sectors of the economy. 14
Given the facts of this case, one can but wonder whether the Supreme Court
intends ever to recede from a per se category once established. If not, we
have here a most unusual display of stare decisis for this late date,' 5
particularly when it be remembered that the ever-fluid American economy is
the backdrop against which antitrust enforcement is played.
One paragraph in the majority opinion contains awesome adverse implica-
tions to the maintenance of the competitive economy which is supposed to be
the objective of the Sherman Act,' 6 especially since what was struck down
may well have been the only means by which smaller grocers would be able
to wage effective, private brand competition with the giants. If so, the
giants gained a permanent and destructive competitive edge with the Court's
blessing.
Whether or not we would decide this case the same way under the
rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before
us. The fact is that the courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, de-
struction of competition in one sector of the economy against promotion
of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formu-
lated per se rules.17
The contrary position of the Chief Justice was that antitrust cases never are
easy, and the welfare of consumers, not difficulty or the convenience of
courts, is the proper focus in formulating per se rules.' 8 Evidently the issue
established categories of per se violations. 405 U.S. at 615-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In the face of the majority's footnote concession, one can only wonder why Mr. Justice
Blackmun, deploring the result because an unfair advantage was conferred on the big
chains, nevertheless felt compelled to concur because he believed this per se category
already was firmly established. Id. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
14. 405 U.S. at 610-11. This statement is correct only in the per se context. Rule
of reason analysis invokes exactly such a weighing analysis.
15. Contrast Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, discussing stare decisis in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 623 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). A constitutional
point was in issue, but the Supreme Court long ago claimed for itself a role analogous
to constitutional interpretation for Sherman Act cases. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). For an extensive analysis indicating that
stare decisis generally is a much weakened doctrine, see Flittie & Armour, The Natural
Gas Act Experience-A Study in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure to
Control the Legislative Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448, 473-75 (1965).
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 469-93 (1940).
17. 405 U.S. at 609-10.
18. Id. at 624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In contrast Mr. Justice Marshall for the
majority stated, id. at 609-10 n.10, that per se predictability of legality or illegality
should be the prime consideration absent congressional direction to abandon some or
all per se categories. Then, if so directed, the courts could "ramble through the wilds
of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." It is elementary that
dumping the matter on Congress will not square with the history of per se. It is a
Court-made creation. See part II infra.
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had been very sharply drawn in the Court's internal deliberations leading to
decision, and the statement quoted merits the dignity of a deliberate judicial
dictum.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE SHERMAN ACT § 1 PER SE CONCEPT
The per se concept for Sherman Act § 1 violations developed in a
circuitous manner as a court-imposed gloss upon statutory language. A
concise description is found in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.'9
In that case the Court said that there are "certain agreements or practices
which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and there-
fore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use."' 20 In terms of the rigid Supreme Court
posture in Topco, the modifying adjective "elaborate" may well be excised
from this description unless it is confined to meaning that any inquiry beyond
mere identification is elaborate. Although there are, and long have been,
serious breaches in the integrity of nearly all per se categories, 2' the
Supreme Court in Topco rejected consideration of any defensive testimony
concerning business context despite the fact that such testimony actually was
available in a rather attractive case record.22
It should be remarked in tracing the origins of per se that there are some
very early Sherman Act cases that superficially seem to speak in tones of per
se. For example, in the 1897 case of United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n23 a rate fixing agreement among competing railroads was
declared "illegal on its face."'24 However, cases prior to 1911 are really
literal readings of Sherman Act statutory language, not initiations of the per
se concept as an exception to rule of reason analysis.25
The route to our present per se categories is more circuitous. Per se is a
concept that could not emerge until after the landmark 1911 decision of
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.2 6 There the Supreme
Court rejected literal reading of Sherman Act § 1 by implying into it from
the underlying common law a "rule of reason" to the effect that only
unreasonable restraints are illegal.2 7 Only with that case's articulation of
19. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1169-
70 (1964).
22. Note 13 supra and accompanying text.
23. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also Dr. Miles Medical Co. y. John D. Park & Sons,
220 U.S. 373 (1911); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
24. 166 U.S. at 341.
25. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
26. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). There is an elaborate examination into the origins and de-
velopment of the rule of reason, including the contributions of particular past justices
of the Supreme Court in Bork, supra note 4, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965). The develop-
ment of the rule of reason actually has been a record of progressive diminishment in
its application caused by growth of the per se concept.
27. The pertinent sections of the RESTATEMENT OF CoNmTAcrs (1932) describing
legal and illegal restraints of trade at common law are as follows:
§ 4. Bargain Defined. A bargain is an agreement of two or more per-
sons to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance.
1976]
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the rule of reason concept could the format for developing per se classifica-
tions as exceptions to rule of reason inquiry come into existence.
One may postulate that, starting with 1911, all restraints of trade were
entitled to be tested in litigation developing the relative merit, or lack
thereof, in a challenged practice. The Court has said that it alone creates
per se categories, and then only when it knows "enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. ''28
Thus, while some may try to identify then Circuit Judge Taft's opinion in
the 1898 case of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.2 9 as the
inception of the Sherman Act § 1 per se rule, it cannot be in any literal sense
by reason of the historic sequence described. Moreover, upon close exami-
nation the Addyston opinion is found to be rested on the same distinction
between legal (reasonable) and illegal (unreasonable) common law restraints
as is the 1911 Standard Oil decision of the Supreme Court. It is just that in
Addyston the blatant price fixing involved needed very little analysis for
condemnation whereas the Supreme Court chose Standard Oil as its authorita-
tive vehicle for declaring and explaining the rule of reason.
No doubt A ddyston with its abrupt condemnation of direct price fixings
made it easier for the Supreme Court in the 1927 case of United States v.
§ 513. Definition of a Bargain in Restraint of Trade. A bargain is in
restraint of trade when its performance would limit competition in any
business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.
§ 514. When a Bargain in Restraint of Trade is Illegal. A bargain in re-
straint of trade is illegal if the restraint is unreasonable.
§ 515. When a Restraint of Trade is Unreasonable. A restraint of trade
is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authorization or dominant
social or economic justification, if it
(a) is greater than is required for the protection of the person for
whose benefit the restraint is imposed, or
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted, or
(c) tends to create, or has for its purpose to create, a monopoly, or to
control prices or to limit production artificially, or
(d) unreasonably restricts the alienation or use of anything that is a
subject of property, or
(e) is based on a promise to refrain from competition and is not ancil-
lary either to a contract for the transfer of good-will or other subject of
property or to an existing employment or contract of employment.
§ 516. Instances of Reasonable Restraints. The following bargains do
not impose unreasonable restraint of trade unless effecting, or forming
part of a plan to effect, a monopoly:(a) A bargain by the transferor of property or of a business not to
compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the prop-
erty or business sold;(b) A bargain by the buyer or lessee of property or of a business not to
use it in competition with or to the injury of the seller or lessor;(c) A bargain to enter into partnership with an actual or possible com-
petitor;(d) A bargain by a partner not to interfere by competition or otherwise
with the business of the partnership while it continues, or subject to rea-
sonable limitation after his retirement;
(e) A bargain to deal exclusively with another;(f) A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with
his employer, or principal during the term of the employment or agency,
or thereafter, within such territory and during such time as may be rea-
sonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal, with-
out imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent.
28. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
29. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afj'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Trenton Potteries Co. 3 0 to uphold a jury instruction to the effect that should
the jury find the price fixing agreements complained of to exist, it might
return a verdict of guilty without regard to the reasonableness of the prices
agreed. 3 1 But from Standard Oil in 1911 until Trenton Potteries in 1927
the Supreme Court never spoke in terms that forbade inquiry into reasona-
bleness of any business practices. Trenton Potteries, dealing with price
fixing, necessarily is the first Sherman Act § 1 per se disposition. 32 Since
1927 about five more per se categories have been recognized.
III. THE SHERMAN ACT § 1 PER SE CATEGORIES
The Supreme Court reserves for itself all initial determinations of per se
categories.3 3  However, there is no statement by the Court which, at any
given time, has purported exhaustively to catalogue the then-recognized per
se restraints, nor is there any perfect agreement among the writers who have
addressed this matter. The nearest the Court has come was in White Motor
Co. v. United States3 4 where tying, division of markets, group boycotts, both
vertical and horizontal price fixings, 35 and, at a considerably removed part
of the opinion, horizontal territorial restrictions 36 were identified as per se
proscribed violations. The somewhat casual nature of these pronouncements
militates against their elevation to the rank of judicial dicta cataloguing all
then-recognized per se categories.
Oppenheim and Weston list five situations as Sherman Act § 1 per se
restraints: price fixing agreements among competitors, agreements to limit
production, agreements to divide markets, resale price maintenance agree-
ments with distributors, and group boycotts.3 7  Von Kalinowski in his
treatise classifies the per se restraints as vertical and horizontal price fixings,
tying arrangements, vertical and horizontal boycotts, vertical and horizontal
divisions of markets, and reciprocal dealings.38  A principal general search
text for lawyers includes this somewhat variant group: tying agreements,
agreements among competitors to divide markets or allocate customers,
30. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
31. Id. at 401.
32. 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 6.02[31[b] (1976) recognizes Trenton Potteries as the first per se case. Su-
preme Court comment in Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 682
(1975), is supportive of this view. But see the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-13 (1940), where he suggests the
per se concept originates with the turn of the century cases cited in note 23 supra.
33. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
34. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In White there was refusal to pronounce per se condem-
nation upon vertically imposed territorial and customer restrictions inasmuch as not
enough yet was known to consider taking the disposition from rule of reason analysis.
35. Id. at 259-60.
36. Id. at 263. There is no square supporting citation. Actually, per e status in
horizontal territorial restriction was not attained until 1967 at the earliest, 1972 at the
latest. Notes 12, 13 supra and accompanying text.
37. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, CASES AND COM-
MENTS 18 (3d ed. 1968).
38. J. VON KALiNowSKI, supra note 32, § 6.02[3][a]. In his subsequent text, how-
ever, this author undermines his categorization of reciprocal dealing as a per se by stat-
ing before it can be so classified it must have been "used to stifle competition." Id.
§ 6.03[3][f]. The only authority cited in support is United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948), which is a Sherman Act § 2 conspiratorial monopolization case.
1976]
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group boycotts, agreements to limit production, and price fixings, both
vertical and horizontal. 39
While a precise determination of per se categories is not essential to this
Article since its conclusion would not vary with the addition or subtraction of
a doubtful category, it is suggested that the following were the Sherman Act
§ 1 per se restraints as of the commencement of the Supreme Court's new
term in 1975:
(1) price fixing agreements; 40
(2) agreements to limit supply or production; 41
(3) horizontal territorial restrictions;
(4) vertical territorial and customer restrictions where title has passed
from the supplier; 42
(5) group boycotts;
(6) tying.
Should a cornering case arise, it might be classified as a separate per se,43
although cornering a market is a genus so closely related to price fixing it
could readily be treated as part of that category in its indirect price fixing
subdivision. 44
IV. How CONSISTENT IN PER SE DISPOSITIONS ARE THE
PER SE CATEGORIES?
Not very. Two leading proponents of broadened per se dispositions
concede "there will always be borderline cases in which conduct may not be
clearly forbidden or clearly lawful."' 45 Then, following a discussion de-
39. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices
§ 32 (1971).
40. Price fixings not involving competitors or suppliers may not be reached by per
se condemnation because they are neither horizontal nor vertical in nature. Evans v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The Supreme Court as yet has
not pronounced per se condemnation even though the power to compel price agreement
exists. It is probable that when the Supreme Court referred to both vertical and hori-
zontal price fixing it intended to cover all price fixings that affect enough commerce
for Sherman Act jurisdiction to attach, and there resulted a somewhat infelicitous state-
ment that is vulnerable to narrow readings.
41. There is some doubt whether this is a separate category in that it definitely is
an offshoot of price fixing in its indirect, as opposed to direct phase. The root case
for the category would be United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940), which is analyzed in terms of an indirect price fixing accomplished through sup-
ply restrictions. Refusals of the Antitrust Division to pursue per se dispositions in some
production restriction situations, hereafter discussed, makes separate treatment desirable
for the purpose of this Article.
42. This category evolved from a broader categorization of vertical territorial and
customer restrictions that was considered in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963). In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the court
receded from the implications of its holding in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964), which arguably placed even consignments in hazard of becoming per se viola-
tions, and limited per se effects to situations where territorial or customer restrictions
are imposed even though title has passed from the supplier. Any implications in the
prior case reaching beyond title passage situations are expressly eschewed. 388 U.S. at
379-80. The net effect of these decisions is that consignment situations are measured
in rule of reason testing but title passage situations involving vertical territorial or custo-
mer restrictions are assigned a per se categorization.
43. Cf. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542 (1913). This case was decided
14 years before the per se concept evolved.
44. See part IV, Indirect Price Fixing, infra.
45. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 5, at 142.
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signed to justify per se despite its being a somewhat blunt instrument, these
writers further concede that some practices, specifically identifying tying,
"may not be subject to a per se rule in the strict sense" but still should be
declared illegal as "nearly" per se violations. 46 This weak characterization
of tying was made in 1959, despite the Supreme Court's immediately
preceding 1958 identification of tying as a per se47 which indicates that
what actually is limited rule of reason inquiry cannot, by labels, be convert-
ed, even by the Supreme Court, into what it is not. We will return to tying, the
most interesting and weakest of Sherman Act § 1 per se restraints, but, let us
begin with the firmest.
(1) Price Fixing. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States48 was decided
in 1918, nine years before the per se rule evolved in Trenton Potteries.49
Therefore, the case quite properly was decided by rule of reason analysis,
despite the fact that it involved plain direct price fixing by competing traders
over a small, but significant, fraction of total grain sales, and that the fixes
were only for very short time intervals. The challenged practice survived
rule of reason testing because the Court found its demonstrated benefits
outweighed any evils. 50 The case is yet the source of probably the most
quoted explanation of how full scale rule of reason analysis works:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effects, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. 5 '
If this statement were only cut adrift from its own price fixing facts when the
price fixing per se evolved, there would be nothing remarkable about
Chicago Board of Trade. But the case continues as live authority, capable
of according rule of reason analysis in some price fixing situations. 2
In the 1940 case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 5 3 the
Supreme Court was at great pains to distinguish Chicago Board of Trade.
Socony-Vacuum's author, Mr. Justice Douglas, stated in ,this regard:
That case involved a prohibition on the members of the Chicago Board
of Trade from purchasing or offering to purchase . . . grains [arriving
while the Board of Trade was closed overnight and otherwise] at a price
46. Id. at 144.
47. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
48. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
49. This case involved a simple direct price fix plus a restriction of sales to certainjobbers which could be characterized as an indirect price fix. 273 U.S. at 395.
50. 246 U.S. at 239-41. This reasoning is an antithesis of the refusal to consider
competitive pluses in the Topco case discussed in part I supra.
51. Id. at 238.
52. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
53. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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other than the closing bid. . . . No attempt was made to show that
the purpose or effect of the rule was to raise or depress prices. The
rule affected only a small proportion of the commerce in question ...
Since it was not aimed at price manipulation or the control of the market
prices and since it had 'no appreciable effect on general market prices,'
the rule survived as a reasonable restraint of trade.54
Immediately following, Mr. Justice Douglas, now dealing with the Socony-
Vacuum's facts which involved production and marketing restrictions, elimi-
nation of competitive "evils" such as price cutters operating in a very
depressed market, and other price stabilizing tactics which the opinion
classed as indirect price fixings, pronounced per se anathema as follows:
Any combination which tampers with price structure is engaged in an
unlawful activity. . . [T]he Sherman Act, so far as price fixing
agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all
industries alike. .... 55
Proof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices
and that it caused them to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof
of the completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the Act. 56
The variant dispositions are not intellectually satisfying, but this strained
Chicago Board of Trade exception has been maintained.5 7  Given its
history, the exception must be accepted as a valid price fixing rule of reason
precedent of limited application. As such the Chicago Board of Trade
exception has performed signal service. For example, it necessarily filled the
interval between 1927 and the securities acts of 1933 and 1934, when other-
wise many exchange activities would have been per se illegal.58
54. Id. at 217.
55. Id. at 221-22. Moreover, the violation is complete, without more, upon attain-
ing agreement, for the Sherman Act conspiracy is on the common law basis requiring
no overt act beyond the act of agreeing. Id. at 224-25 n.59.
56. Id. at 224.
57. The maintained exception emerges as early as Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 599 (1936). In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958),
Chicago Board of Trade is cited as an example of a case where no unreasonable restraint
was found, and there are citations to the same general effect in Denver Union Stock
Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Mkt'g Ass'n, 356 U.S. 282, 287, 306 (1958), and
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967). These citations
can be explained as citations to a sound rule of law no longer applicable in the price
fixing context in which it was enumerated, but Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 360-61 (1963), cites Chicago Board of Trade as a basis for excusing member-agreed
limitations upon exchange membership though exempting SEC powers were absent. (It
is true this citation occurred in a context where the Court also said such exemption of
self-regulation was necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, but Chicago
Board of Trade, prominently cited and relied upon, long predates the securities acts of
1933 and 1934.) In Silver it was group boycotting, another per se, that was in issue.
The Court since has moved further toward a position of exceptions as something au-
thorized by implication in the acts regulating the exchanges. Gordon v. New York
Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 692 (1975); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409
U.S. 289, 304 (1973). See also United States v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694 (1975), which deals with mutual fund pricing under the Investment Com-
pany Act. But this does not eliminate the evident substantial reliance on Chicago Board
of Trade at least as late as 1963 in Silver. Nor is it to be lightly taken that so able
a federal judge as Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit seems to find Chicago Board
of Trade a sound independent precedent as of 1975 in Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d
1231, 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
58. Cf. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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Exactly such considerations ruled Judge Medina's 1953 decision in United
States v. Morgan,59 popularly known as the Investment Bankers case. The
syndicating practices of seventeen major investment banking houses were
involved, particularly their agreements upon underwriting prices to be paid
issuers and public offering prices to be charged by them for the securities
issues thus acquired. These practices had antecedents in the last century
which continued through the interval after the enactment of the Sherman
Act6  until challenged here. Judge Medina was positive that SEC regula-
tion, commencing in the mid-1930's, neither expressly nor impliedly con-
ferred Sherman Act immunity on the investment banking practices before
him.61 He rested his decision upon rule of reason analysis, citing Chicago
Board of Trade.62 From the standpoint of the Government this case was at
least the Antitrust Division's case of the year, and so convincing was the trial
court's disposition there was no appeal. This history of the price fixing per
se gives rise to a contradiction, for it is to say that agreed price fixing is a per
se violation except when there is a price fix that experience or common sense
sufficiently demonstrate should be governed by rule of reason analysis. 63
There are other possible deserving candidates for rule of reason treatment
in the price fixing area. Consider, for example, Albrecht v. Herald Co.,64
where the vertical fixing of maximum prices by a supplier was per se
condemned.65 Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is a masterful demonstration
that separating desirable from undesirable consequences in the case of such
maximums would be better left to rule of reason if the advantage of ultimate
consumers is the real concern of the antitrust laws. 66
Indirect Price Fixing. Not all price fixing situations can be disposed of on
the abbreviated evidentiary record the Court claims is a primary advantage
of per se enforcement.6 7  If a conspiring combination of separate entities
has hidden its agreement in a sophisticated manner there is apt to ensue the
equivalent of a rule of reason trial record in the course of settling the
conspiracy issue. The trial record may be so enormous in bulk that all that
will be gained from per se enforcement is the avoidance of the detailed court
findings or jury instructions appropriate to rule of reason inquiries. 68 Such
59. 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
60. Id. at 636.
61. Id. at 697.
62. Id. at 688-91.
63. Cf. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1240 (1975). There is also an ob-
scure suggestion in a recent Supreme Court case that the price fixing necessarily present
when two competing newspapers use a joint corporation to set subscription and advertis-
ing rates might be legal if one of the newspapers were a failing company. Citizen Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1969). If so, this would be another
breach in the per se price fixing front.
64. 390 U.S. 145 (1967).
65. Id. at 153.
66. ld. at 156-68.
67. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
68. The best examples of this problem are the conscious parallelism pricing cases
such as United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), and United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Conscious parallelism once threatened to be-
come a per se in its own right, but the trend was terminated by Theater Enterprises v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), in which the Supreme Court
stated that "[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made
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gains are of small importance unless it be assumed our federal courts have
such small competence their ignorance should be masked where possible by
per se rules.69
Not all price fixing is simple direct agreement among competitors, whether
the agreement be open or hidden. Indirect price fixings, even though there
is no substantial dispute as to the overt acts in issue, can generate immense
records of contending evidence equal or greater than rule of reason case-in-
chief and defense efforts in the course of determining what meaning attaches
to such facts. This problem is well exemplified by two cases which both
predate the emergence of the per se concept. American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States70 today would be classified as an indirect price fixing
accomplished through exchange of past pricing information, but Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States,7 1 decided just four years
later and practically identical in its basic facts, is an example of a successful
rule of reason defense because no purpose to fix prices was found. 72
The trial route to rule of reason or per se disposition in such cases is about
the same, long and complex. This phenomenon is no recent discovery. The
stem case for indirect price fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 73 exhibited fully this aspect in its treatment of a hidden conspiracy
engaged in tampering with supplies in an indirect and sophisticated man-
ner.74 In short, only the comparatively easy indirect price fixing cases will
produce summary per se dispositions. 75 The hard, complex cases will
heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitudes toward conspiracy; but 'conscious
parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." Id. at 541.
This type of case will not yield to limited inquiry, as abundantly demonstrated by the
proof tactics described in Lasky, The Long Bow or Lucretius, Book IV, Line 817, 43
CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1955).
69. This attitude is criticized in part V infra.
70. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
71. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
72. In the latest case of this exchange-of-past-prices genre, United States v. Con-
tainer Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969), a bare majority of five Justices in a notably opaque
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas seem to per se condemn paperboard industry exchanges
of past prices information. One concurring Justice and three dissenters objected to the
per se treatment. Since the majority conceded that there can be exchange of past prices
in less concentrated industries which could test out as legal, id. at 337, the likelihood
that this case really is a per se precedent is small. Given the majority's language and
the division of Justices in this case, it is fairly predictable the 1976 Court membership
will not find exchange of past price information a per se violation, which means the
problem noted in the accompanying text continues.
73. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
74. Further examples of complex per se cases are Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); and the case which probably best epitomizes the hidden
conspiracy engaged in a highly sophisticated price fix, Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). This problem underlies the discussion in Flittie, Pretrial
of Antitrust Conspiracy Cases-The Holland Safeguard and Judicial Notice, 17 Sw. L.J.
1, 18-22 (1963), in which is discussed United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., Civ. No.
11584-C (S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950). In that case the plaintiff put in issue production
restricting practices in some 400 California oil pools, with rule of reason or per se dis-
position turning on whether the restrictions were valid reservoir engineering, or merely
ostensibly such for the hidden purpose of limiting supply to demand. The enormous
problem of proof is the same regardless of whether per se or rule of reason rules the
outcome.
75. An example of an easy fact situation is Plymouth Dealers Ass'n v. United
States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960), where there were agreements upon recommended
price lists and trade-in discounts. Another example is Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
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continue to produce litigation not significantly different from rule of reason
inquiry and disposition.
(2) Agreements To Limit Supply or Production. Agreements limiting
supply and production tend to be tested as Sherman Act § 2 multi-party
monopolizations rather than § 1 restraints of trade. 76  Further, as already
remarked, this category can be and has been treated as a species of price
fixing per se by using means that are indirect rather than direct. 77 The first
case in which this type of restriction was brought under close scrutiny by the
Supreme Court was Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States.7 8 That case
involved among other things elimination by agreement of "pyramided"
offerings of coal for sale. By these agreements the same ton of coal, offered
for sale by producers through multiple selling agents, inflated the apparent
supply in the market place.7 9 This aspect, in terms of its treatment seven
years later in the 1940 Socony-Vacuum decision, suggests the propriety of
treating supply and production restrictions as a separate per se category.80
A fair reading of Appalachian Coals' subsequent history merits its eval-
uation today as a strictly limited precedent -that might be followed in times
of severe economic distress comparable to the early 1930's, particularly if
,there were involved an even more specially depressed specific industry
condition resembling that of the coal industry in the Great Depression eco-
nomy. At any rate, as with Chicago Board of Trade, the Supreme Court
despite many opportunities to overrule Appalachian Coals has refrained
from doing so. Despite the notable lack of success in citing Appalachian
Coals, -the current status of this precedent made it possible for a federal
district judge to cite that case in the 1970's as authority for the following
statement: "[I]t is true that compelling economic need may under certain
rare conditions be a defense to price fixing .... -81
The Socony-Vacuum case involved agreement among major integrated oil
companies upon a buying program designed to take "distress" gasoline out of
weak independent refiner hands, thus ameliorating the price depressing
impact of excess gasoline supplies thrown in an unplanned manner upon an
already weak market swept by intense retail price wars. It is a fair surmise
that the gasoline acquired from the independent refiner, and thereafter
worked into the market in a less disruptive fashion by the majors, resulted in
some curtailment of their own gasoline production as well. Certainly, crude
States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), which involved agreements and pricing formulas to main-
tain differentials between premium and standard grades of product. In both the practice
to be tested was not deeply hidden or complex.
76. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 32, § 6.02[2][f]. Sherman Act § 2 monopoli-
zations, whether single- or multi-party, are per se illegal upon identification, but in a
complex circumstantial evidence monopolization case, to attain the point where a per se
pronouncement can be made also will involve extensive contested proofs.
77. See text accompanying notes 68-75 supra.
78. 288 U.S. 344 (1933). This case also was a direct price fixing case in that erst-
while competing coal producers had delegated sale of their combined production to their
common exclusive sales agent, Appalachian Coals, Inc., which set the prices.
79. Id. at 363.
80. 310 U.S. at 221-24.




oil, both their own and that from independent producers, in enormous and
today almost unbelievably cheap supply in the mid-1930's, was no limiting
factor. 82
The economic backdrop for Socony-Vacuum evidenced some improve-
ments over the early 1930's setting of Appalachian Coals. There was
modest gain in business activities. At least equally important, the panic
psychology initially attending the inception of the Great Depression had
subsided. This shift was even more pronounced by the time of the Court's
1940 decision when, under the impact of World War II already begun in
Europe, business was beginning to boom. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Roberts
in his dissent accurately noted:
It is said that their combination [in Socony-Vacuum] had the purpose
and effect of putting a floor under the spot market for gasoline. But that
was precisely the purpose and effect of the Appalachian case. True the
means adopted to overcome the effects of the dumping of distress prod-
ucts on the market were not the same in the two cases, but means are
unimportant provided purpose and effect are lawful. 83
Apart from time lapse, erosion of the public panic psychology attending the
beginning of the Depression, and a considerable change in the membership
of the Court, the only strong basis for distinguishing these two cases is that
Socony-Vacuum involved what probably was the economically strongest
industry in the country, while Appalachian Coals involved probably the
weakest.8 4
In language even less persuasive than that with which he had distin-
guished Chicago Board of Trade, Mr. Justice Douglas pronounced in Socony-
Vacuum concerning Appalachian Coals:
The methods . . . were quite divergent. [The distress gasoline] buying
programs... had as their direct purpose... the raising and mainten-
ance of ... market prices . . . by the elimination of distress gasoline.
. . . [T]he plan in the Appalachian Coals case was not designed to
operate vis-a-vis the general consuming market. . . . [T]he effect, if
any, of that plan on prices was not only wholly incidental but also
highly conjectural .... And as we have seen it would per se constitute
such a restraint if price fixing were involved [in Appalachian Coals.]85
This explanation will not rise to greater dignity than the otherwise unsup-
portable fiat of a court of last resort. By tests recognized as early as 1927,
and since, Appalachian Coals is a case involving practices which, in the con-
text of the present coal business, would be condemned per se. That it is
not overruled means an indistinct zone of supply and production restrictions
has been left for analysis in a more sympathetic manner than per se treatment
which, strictly applied, never listens to reason.
On balance, it is well the Court acted as it did even though its reasoning is
not intellectually persuasive. As is well known to petroleum reservoir
engineers, most oil pools of good quality are rate sensitive. Producing them
82. 310 U.S. at 171-74.
83. Id. at 261-62.
84. Cf. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 180-81 (1945)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
85. 310 U.S. at 216.
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with due regard for this sensitivity exhibits a pattern where a lower
producing rate usually significantly increases ultimate recovery, whereas high
producing rates leave the pool expulsion mechanisms, i.e., native energy,
exhausted with a great deal of otherwise recoverable oil unproducible, locked
in the reservoir. From this developed the petroleum industry's concept of
maximum efficient rates (MERs) at which pools should be produced.8 6
To put MERs into effect requires agreement among the several producers
usually present in any petroleum reservoir. If all cannot agree, none can
agree, and avoidance of drainage through selfishly excessive production rates
by some will compel all to more rapid and dramatically less efficient
methods.8 7 The need for cooperation through agreement among producers
in a pool grows even more pressing in instances of pressure maintenance
projects and secondary recovery operations designed at great expense to
maintain pressures or re-energize exhausted reservoirs.8 8
Honoring these immutable natural physical phenomena concerning oil
reservoirs, counsel for the United States in United States v. Standard Oil Co.
of California9 carefully spelled out in pre-trial hearings that no attack was
intended upon agreed reduced producing rates having legitimate reservoir
engineering justifications.9" This position was consistent with that adopted
by the Government in the earlier oil field unitization case of United States v.
Cotton Valley Operators Committee9 where the Attorney General's state-
ment attending initial filing of the complaint expressly eschewed any attack
on the agreed unitized production limiting activities of ,the defendants, and
declared the Government's case was restricted to attacking joint processing,
refining, and sales agreements among the several operators in the Cotton
Valley pool. 92 When United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California
effectively was concluded by consent decree in 1959, after nearly a decade
of one of the most active and massive pre-trials ever conducted, the decree
expressly exempted agreements
for the control or limitation of production for economic or other reasons
from a pool or connected pools in which all the parties to the agreement
are producers or have a proprietary or other financial interest, including,
but not limited to, unit plans, ratable taking plans, operating agree-
ments, pool MER agreements, well spacing agreements, secondary re-
covery programs and pressure maintenance programs. 93
The United States by consent decree also has accepted agreed limitations
upon lumber production when the purpose is adjustment of cutting to the
sustained yield capacity of forest lands and in accord with sound principles of
86. PETROLEUM CONSERVATION 141-74 (S. Buckley ed. 1951).
87. Id. The worst excesses in this regard today are considerably ameliorated by
state conservation laws and regulations.
88. Id. at 182-247, 278-96.
89. Civil No. 11584-C (S.D. Cal., May 12, 1950).
90. Id., Transcript of March 13, 1950, at 415.
91. Civil No. 2209 (W.D. La., Sept. 20, 1949), dismissal aff'd per curiam for failure
of plaintiff to obey an order for production of documents, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
92. Press release dated June 17, 1947, quoted in R. HARDWICKE, ANTITRUST LAWS,
ET AL V. UNIT OPERATION OF OIL OR GAS POOLS 224 (1948).
93. 1959 Trade Cas. 69,399, at 75,529 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
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forest management. 94  In short, there are and probably will be yet other
supply and production restrictions which should be permitted to avoid con-
demnation by per se testing. These situations need the Appalachian Coals
precedent to demonstrate that rule of reason analysis is not excluded in all
situations.
(3) Horizontal Territorial Restrictions. The origin of this recently pro-
nounced per se category has been described and criticized95 in the preceding
Topco case discussion.96 Despite its debatable origin, as yet no decisions
inconsistent with Topco have developed. Inherently there has to be a
fundamental flaw in allowing exceptional treatments for exceptional situa-
tions in the older, and presumably sounder, per se categories, but not here.
However, until the Supreme Court softens its stand or fails to hold the line
against the lower courts when and if exceptions develop, this per se category,
resting on the uncompromising language of Topco, is the most extravagantly
rigid of all. 97 Measured by the facts of Topco, one can project stare decisis
rigidity yet at the same time suggest that so uncompromising a stance will be
difficult to maintain.
(4) Vertical Territorial and Customer Allocations Where Title Has Passed
from the Supplier. The 1967 case of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co.98 is the source of this recent per se category. Already decisions have
appeared in the lower courts which deviate from the line set by Schwinn. In
Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.99 the Third Circuit permitted a manufacturer to
restrict users of a certain cosmetic product to barbers and beauticians after
sale by the manufacturer. The reason was physical hazard to members of
the public if the product was applied by persons other than experienced
professionals. In Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States'00 the Court of
Claims carved out an exception in upholding a limitation that permitted a
drug supplier to forbid resales in unchanged physical condition of that
portion of the sales of a certain drug sold by the supplier at a lesser price
than usual. The reasoning was that the cheaper supply was only to be used
by buyers for blending with other drugs into a distinct composite product.
This assertion of resale control was held justified when the same drug was
available to customers for resales at the higher regular price.
Reluctantly obeying the Schwinn command, the Tenth Circuit in Adolph
Coors Co. v. FTC101 held per se condemned attempted supplier controls
94. United States v. National Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n, Civil No. 11,262 (D.D.C., May
6, 1941), consent decree reported at 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,123, at 492-95.
95. Part I supra.
96. Clear emergence of this per se category was in 1972, but arguably it has existed
since 1967. Note 13 supra.
97. See notes 14, 17 supra and accompanying texts.
98. 388 U.S. 365 (1967); see note 42 supra for details of this emergence.
99. 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
100. 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
101. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 506 F.2d 934, 947 (5th Cir. 1975), which refused to join with the Tenth Circuit
recommendation because there was no evidence such a concession was necessary to
Coors' business survival. The decision remarks that before a per se exception should
be allowed it should be demonstrated that less restrictive means of quality control are
not possible. To develop a trial record of that extent, then consider it in terms of such
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after title to beer supplies had passed. These controls were designed to
maintain quality control from brewery to consumer. Involved were territori-
al and customer restrictions that assured speedy, refrigerated delivery of a
premium unpasteurized beer. The court found these restrictions so reasona-
ble that it recommended the Supreme Court consider making exceptions
"when a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify its
territorial restraints under the rule of reason.' 1 0 2  Further Tenth Circuit
reluctance is demonstrated in Redd v. Shell Oil Co. 10 3 where, without much
justification, such restrictions were said not to be per se violations unless
enforced by "firm and resolute action by the seller."'
1 0 4
The rigid, formalistic nature of this per se category was severely criticized
by Mr. Justice Stewart in his Schwinn partial dissent:
[T]he Court has, sua sponte, created a bluntly indiscriminate and de-
structive weapon which can be used to dismantle a vast variety of distri-
butional systems-competitive and anticompetitive, reasonable and un-
reasonable . . . . [I]t is particularly disappointing to see the Court
balk at the label 'sale,' and turn from reasoned response to a wooden
and irrelevant formula. 10 5
The sua sponte aspect in that criticism comes about because government
counsel at all stages of Schwinn had conceded it was a case for rule of reason
disposition so that, necessarily, the per se disposition derives wholly from an
initiative by the Court majority. Quite understandably this Justice queries
how the Court possibly could have assembled an adequately litigated record
upon which to make its per se pronouncement in such circumstances,' 0 and
then suggests that the competitive realities of markets, not ancient common
law rules concerning restraints on alienation of property titles, properly
should be the area of inquiry in a Sherman Act case. "[T]he Court inex-
plicably turns its back on the values of competition by independent mer-
chants and the flexible wisdom of the rule of reason when dealing with
distribution. . . . Without considering its function, purpose or effect, the
Court declares this [the resale restriction] aspect of Schwinn's program to be
per se invalid.' 0
7
On remand of Schwinn the trial court authorized the supplier to designate
territories of prime responsibility for its distributors and terminate any whose
representation in such territories was inadequate.' 0 8 Taken in conjunction
with monetary "passover" clauses where the resale is outside a purchaser's
supplier-designated territory of primary responsibility, 0 9 it well may turn
findings of fact and conclusions of law, trenches so closely on a fairly wide rule of rea-
son contest as to be virtually indistinguishable.
102. 497 F.2d at 1187.
103. 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 1058.
105. 388 U.S. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. Id. at 388.
107. Id. Moreover, the common law rule is against unreasonable restraints on
alienation, not all restraints.
108. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 565-66 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
109. In Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill.
1972), a 7% passover of gross receipts on sales outside a designated area was held rea-
sonable. Professor Donald F. Turner, who headed the Justice Department's Antitrust
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out that these per se condemned practices can be effectively resurrected on a
legal basis. If so, the premonition of Mr. Justice Stewart that the Court has
"created considerable business for legal draftsmen" to write ways around this
particular per se will have come to pass. 110 Such a response is, of course,
bound to give rise to very complicated evidentiary records, whether the
ultimate disposition is by per se or rule of reason.
With the then current example of Sandura Co. v. FTC"' before it, the
Supreme Court might have proceeded with more care in measuring the
desirability of creating this category of per se violation. In Sandura Co. the
Sixth Circuit had before it the situation of a small, struggling manufacturer of
floor coverings which rather clearly could not have afforded to operate
through consignments and almost certainly would have failed had it not been
for its adoption of closed distributor territories. These closed territories
enabled the company to obtain strong dealers and survive. The opinion
upholding the practice is a classic demonstration of the continuing need for
rule of reason treatment in this area. One may predict with some certainty
that this category will and should be riddled with deserving exceptions in
years to come."12
(5) Group Boycotts. This per se category, also called concerted refusal to
deal, originates in the 1941 case of Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
FTC."'3 Strictly speaking, this is not a Sherman Act decision. The Federal
Trade Commission has no Sherman Act jurisdiction. Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 5a," 4 however, confers parallel powers, and a great deal
more, in statutory language empowering 'the Commission to identify and
suppress "unfair methods of competition.""'5 Mr. Justice Black's opinion in
this case, reviewing such a Commission inquiry, often is cited as authority for
Division in the mid-1960's, has taken the position that profit passovers and repayment-
of-cost passovers related to areas of primary responsibility are not per se condemned.
M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 638 (1975).
110. 388 U.S. at 394. Demonstrating this point is the drafting attempt in Reed
Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975). The opinion is by Mr.
Justice Clark (retired).
111. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
112. Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 522 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.
1975), discusses the pattern of developing exceptions to Schwinn, then purports to make
a per se disposition because it was not shown a less restricting alternative could not have
been used. Judge Gee, specially concurring, states a view of the case in terms that nec-
essarily amount to a rule of reason disposition. Id. at 1309. The logic of Judge Gee's
position is unassailable.
113. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). An argument could be made that Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930), is the first per se of this category
but for the fact that it contains an abundance of rule of reason analysis. In addition,
the case is not cited in Fashion Originators' Guild.
114. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970). Section 5(a) is 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
115. Any doubt that the Federal Trade Commission has authority to go considerably
beyond the bounds of Sherman and Clayton Act violations in defining "unfair competi-
tion" was eliminated by FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). One
has an uncomfortable feeling that some Sherman Act § 1 per se content has been "boot-
strapped" into "unfair competition" through these FTC administrative law proceedings
in which the presumed expertise of the Commission is a barrier to full review. The
FTC precedent is later cited as authority for per se treatment in Sherman Act cases.
Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949).
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per se treatment of group boycotts under Sherman Act § 1, a recent example
being the 1966 Supreme Court opinion in United States v. General Motors
Corp.116
Fashion Originators' Guild posed such attractive facts for a successful
defense one may speculate it possibly could have been accorded rule of
reason testing had it come up as a Sherman Act case, free of the element of
presumed expertise which the Commission wields. 117  The case involved a
combination of manufacturers of women's garments and textiles who had
agreed they would refuse to deal with manufacturers and retailers who dealt
with competitors that pirated the dress or textile designs of members of the
combination. The aim of the members in both its horizontal and vertical
aspects was to protect against what probably was tortious conduct under state
law. The court concluded, however, that "even if copying were an acknowl-
edged tort under the law of every state, that situation would not justify
petitioners in combining together . .. ."I's
This particular per se has been maintained quite firmly-with one glaring
exception. As a result of this exception one cannot take literally the Court's
declaration, exemplified in the 1966 General Motors case, that upon finding
concerted action to deprive others of access to merchandise they wish to sell
the public, "we need not inquire into the economic motivation underlying
their conduct.""19 Suppose an automobile manufacturer has franchised four
dealers occupying small, contiguous territories. One of these for purely
selfish and aggressive business reasons persuades the manufacturer to agree
to get rid of the other three and give the enlarged territory to him. Or
suppose the manufacturer takes the initiative for its selfish business purpose
of confining retail outlets to fewer and stronger dealers, who then can pay
somewhat higher prices to their supplier by reason of increased volumes.
Such acts are legal' 20 even though it is inescapable that there is present
group action which deprives the ousted dealers of merchandise they wish to
continue selling to the public. However, add to these facts a motive to get
rid of the three because they were price cutters, or to mask the cutting off of
116. 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966).
117. Cf. Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 308 F. Supp. 1041, 1047 (E.D.
Pa. 1970), and the Court's own comments in Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. at
466-67.
118. 312 U.S. at 468.
119. 384 U.S. at 146.
120. This well-established deviant line of cases is developed and discussed in Mogul
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1310-12 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a leading per se boycott case where
the victim was a price cutter, the Supreme Court emphasized that the group activity al-
leged was "not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor even of a
manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship." Id. at 212. As said
in De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1975), "a concerted
activity constitutes a 'group boycott' and is considered per se in restraint of trade when
'there [is] a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market, or to accom-
plish'some other anticompetitive object, or both.'" This case collects impressive author-
ity to support the existence of the exception. Id. at 1317-18. Calnetics Corp. v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1976), Chastain v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1975), and Sum of Squares, Inc. v.
Market Research Corp. of America, 401 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), openly
state that this "purpose" test divides per se dispositions from rule. of reason dispositions.
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one who was a price cutter by termination of the other two. There would
beyond peradventure be a boycott violation of Sherman Act § 1.121
The trouble is that the forbidden situations cannot be identified in per se
terms. Legality and illegality will depend upon extensive inquiry involving
what usually will be essentially a circumstantial evidence case.122 It is
splitting hairs at this point to say that a species of rule of reason inquiry is
not in progress. Much evidence of such nature would have to be admitted, or
effectively the right to defend would be denied.
In addition to the gaping hole made by this category in the per se line,
there are other cases. One upholds the exclusion from tournaments of a
professional golfer who did not meet association membership require-
ments. 123  In another, an industry association set product standards some
could not meet, and legality was tested by rule of reason.124 One cannot
but wonder how an agreement having the effect of boycotting either a
supplier or retailer whose merchandise posed a real risk of physical harm to
the public would fare. Where a single manufacturer effectively restricted
the use of his cosmetic product to professionals despite the fact that title had
passed, an exception to the title passage per se was recognized by the Third
Circuit in a 1970 case, and certiorari was denied. 125
(6) Tying. Tying is the practice of requiring another to take a possibly
unwanted thing, the tied item, in order to acquire the tying item. 12 6 Initially,
tying was tested under Clayton Act § 3,127 which limits tying items to
leases, sales and contracts for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities, and tied items to goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities. In brief, the practice is restricted
in coverage to ties involving tangible personalty.
Although a 1922 case indicated that Clayton Act § 3 posed a different,
and at that time apparently more rigid, test for defendants to surmount than
did Sherman Act § 1,128 development of the Sherman Act § 1 tying per se
121. This motive distinction is squarely recognized in Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d
170 (9th Cir. 1975).
122. Id. But cf. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.
1975); a decision which, rejecting the per se test, nevertheless indicates rule of reason
illegality may be present if there are predatory, unfair tactics in preferring one class of
automobile dealer over another.
123. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
124. Structural Laminate Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154(D. Ore. 1966). This case may seem in conflict with the Supreme Court's holding
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), but that
case was a test at the pleading stage directed primarily to the injury to competition ef-
fects which the Court in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959),
already had held would be conclusively presumed in private treble damage cases.
125. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
126. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). It is not tying
if both are offered as a single priced package, with the alternative of taking either alone
also available. Id. at 6 n.4. Presumably this means good faith and not a pricing struc-
ture where the alternative single offerings are so priced as to make the seeming alterna-
tive a mere sham or subterfuge.
127. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). Clayton Act § 3
is 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
128. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459-60 (1922).
[Vol. 30
SHERMAN ACT
has brought about a change. Today the Clayton Act § 3 test, if different at
all, 129 permits more extensive inquiry in a defense against Clayton Act § 3
charges by reason of the statutory requirement there that there be shown an
actual tendency to lessen competition or create a monopoly.' 30 In any event,
with Northern Pacific Railway v. United States'3 ' tying was pronounced a
Sherman Act § 1 per se,' 32 and the impact upon commerce said needed for
jurisdiction to attach was the minimal "not insubstantial" test.'1 3
Importantly, the Sherman Act § 1 per se is not limited, as is Clayton Act §
3, to tangible personal property. The tying devices in Northern Pacific were
railroad deeds and leases of lands; the tied items were contractual require-
ments that the grantees and lessees use the railroad's transportation services
to move commodities produced from or manufactured in the lands deeded or
leased. In Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.'3 4 the tying
condemned was even more exotic. It involved money loans to a developer
with which to acquire building sites, in return for which the developer-
borrower agreed to purchase prefabricated houses for installation in his
development from the manufacturer-lender. 3 5 Presently there is also an
unresolved conflict among the circuits whether trademarks can be per se
tying devices. The Ninth Circuit so held in Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc..3 6  A contrary view is taken in the earlier Second Circuit case of Susser
v. Carvel Corp.,3 7 though the fact of trademark tying is not denied.' 38
129. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1949);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). It is unclear whether
Clayton Act § 3 or Sherman Act § 1 rules the disposition of the latter case. After these
cases comes the exasperating analysis in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), suggesting that Clayton Act § 3 is more readily violated
than Sherman Act § 1. Id. at 608-09. Times-Picayune probably should be treated as
a judicial sport. It cannot be reconciled in its application of law to facts unless one
is prepared to accept reasoning to the effect that morning and afternoon newspaper ad-
vertisings make up but one product if both papers are owned and operated by the same
publisher in the same market.
130. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), interpreted
Clayton Act § 3 to require only a perfunctory quantitative substantiality test. Id. at
304, 310, 314. The subsequent case of Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961), however, enunciated a qualitative test, not satisfied by mere substantial
dollar measures. Id. at 329. Such a test necessarily requires a considerably more devel-
oped evidentiary record than is supposed to be needed for identification and condemna-
tion of true per se violations.
131. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
132. Id. at 8. This does not mean the label necessarily is correct. While the Su-
preme Court can make final disposition of controversies before it, even its unappealable
fiat cannot elevate a test which permits and requires some rule of reason record in de-
ciding tying controversies to the level of a true per se disposition.
133. Id. at 8.
134. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
135. Strictly, it was a wholly owned subsidiary of the manufacturer which made the
loan. Id. at 496-97.
136. 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration
Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972), supports the Ninth
Circuit position.
137. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S.
125 (1965). The Second Circuit lately has reaffirmed its position. Capital Temporar-
ies, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974).
138. The distinction lies in making conclusive the requisite degree of tying power if
a trademark is the tying item (the per se view) as opposed to factual inquiry to deter-
mine if a requisite degree of power resides in the mark (the rule of reason view).
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Fortner states that the economic jurisdictional test for Sherman Act § 1
per se tying is "whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in
terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to
competitors by the tie.' 1 39  If the economic inquiry were so limited, the
tying per se would be essentially within a true per se structure. But
Northern Pacific, the root case, contains this language:
[Tyings] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appre-
ciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and
a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected.' 40
To the extent the economic requisites of the quoted language exceed the
minimal "affecting commerce" economic impact needed for Sherman Act
jurisdiction, the problem necessarily moves from per se into some degree of
rule of reason inquiry.
The lower federal courts have distilled from this Northern Pacific lan-
guage a four-part test. There must be: (1) two separate products, the tying
product and the tied product; (2) sufficient economic power in the tying
market to coerce purchase of the tied product; (3) involvement of a not
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied market; and (4)
anticompetitive effects in the tied market.141  The first requirement is as
unexceptional for per se treatment as the need to find an agreed price in the
price fixing per se.142  But the second, third, and fourth requirements, far
from being satisfied when a more than de minimis economic impact is
shown, have spawned lower court decisions requiring that actual and success-
ful coercion of substantial dimensions affirmatively be shown. 143  These
decisions create a proof problem very different from the conclusive presump-
tions usually found to flow from the mere identifications of such per se
restraints as price fixes,' 44 group boycotts, 45 and horizontal territorial
restrictions. 46
139. 394 U.S. at 501. But on remand the Sixth Circuit overturned a directed ver-
dict for Fortner by the trial court and held there was an issue for the jury as to whether
U.S. Steel had sufficient economic power in terms of loan funds, the tying item. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975).
140. 356 U.S. at 6.
141. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974);
Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1289 (2d Cir. 1974).
142. This is not to say that finding two items in order to find a tying is never a
problem. Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmission, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir.
1972). And see note 129 supra for a failure to find two items in the Times-Picayune
case.
143. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1974);
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971); E.B.E., Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See also the Fortner case on remand, Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975), to this same effect,
citing additional authorities and discussing the showing that must be made according to
whether the tying product is unique or not.
144. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940).
145. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
146. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The per se form-




Baffling, too, is reasoning in another group of lower federal court cases.
Consider the business of professional football where access to tickets to the
regular season games is used to force ticket sales to pre-season exhibition
games. The cases hold there cannot be anticompetitive effects because a
monopoly exists with respect to both items; hence, no competitor is in-
jured. 147 At the very least this is a remarkably narrow view of who are the
competitors of a professional athletic team. Economic reality and common
sense suggest that such competitors are at least all those who compete for the
somewhat inelastic supply of spectator dollars. A forced sale of unwanted
exhibition football tickets cannot but pinch sales of tickets to baseball,
basketball, and hockey events, to name a few of the more obvious.
If 'a per se concept is to be maintained vis-h-vis tying, the proof of an
actual tying in the context of economic facts sufficient for Sherman Act
jurisdiction should be enough to establish the per se restraint. 14  However,
only one clear instance has been identified where a lower federal court has
given unmistakable per se treatment in a tying situation. In Warriner
Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp. 49 the Fifth Circuit, after
adopting the Ninth Circuit view that a trademark could be a per se tying
device, said in peremptory fashion:
[T]he plaintiffs were entitled to have the jury instructed that Copeland's
policies of barring its franchised wholesalers from dealing in compressors
rebuilt by non-authorized rebuilders and of barring its franchised re-
builders from obtaining parts from non-Copeland sources, if proved by
a preponderance of evidence, constituted per se violations of the Sher-
man Act without necessity of proof of 'unreasonableness' and 'anti-
competitive effect." 50
More recent decisions make it doubtful the Fifth Circuit adheres to that
statement.' 5 '
While per se dispositions should not permit inquiry into the reasonableness
of a tying, examinations of several recent trademark tying cases show
reasonableness inquiries in fact have been made. Thus, in Chicken Delight
the trial court submitted to the jury the issue of whether it was justifiable to
compel franchisees to purchase special frying dip mixes and cooking hard-
ware for use at trademark-franchised locations.'5 2 Upon review, the Ninth
Circuit only pointed out that this issue of reasonableness had been resolved
against the franchisor by the jury.153  Similarly, Kolene Corp. v. Motor City
Metal Treating, Inc.15 4 upheld the compelled purchase of metal treating
147. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir.
1974); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (2d Cir. 1974).
148. Cf. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
149. 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1972).
150. Id. at 1016.
151. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir.
1974); Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 711-12 (W.D. Tex.
1974). The latter case suggests inquiry should be had into uniqueness and substitutes
for the tying device in a manner which would have to be substantial rule of reason in-
quiry.
152. 311 F. Supp. at 851.
153. 448 F.2d at 51.
154. 307 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Mich. 1969), aft'd, 440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1971).
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salts by the franchisee for use in treating metals which would bear the
franchisor's mark.
The Federal Trade Commission has gone so far as to uphold as reasonable
compelled purchases of the franchisor's special blend of coffee, and even its
baked goods.155  Evidently this practice, and not a per se approach,
represents the Commission's attitude, for in a 1969 speech at a meeting of
franchisors Commissioner MacIntyre stated that the least restrictive practice
consistent with franchisor quality control is the proper practice.' 5 6  An
evaluation of this type only could be made by permitting defendants to
introduce what necessarily is rule-of-reason-oriented defensive evidence.
Franchise tying is admittedly a somewhat special situation. Nevertheless,
to acknowledge existence of so huge a gap does considerable damage to the
Supreme Court's Northern Pacific declaration that "tying arrangements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.' 115 7
In a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part to Schwinn
Mr. Justice Stewart collects the background of prior Court statements
supporting the desirability of maintaining a franchise business structure
which enables small businessmen to compete, and sometimes thrive, by
presenting a uniform product to a wide public.158  His treatment of the area
raises doubts that the Supreme Court will mechanically uphold a per se
disposition when a franchise tying test case finally comes before it.
The writer of a 1970 article, exploring the tension inherent between the
need for maintenance of quality control over franchisee-dispensed products
and the tying per se, proposed that manufacturer-franchisors should be
entitled to have a purchase requirement compelled upon a franchisee
evaluated in terms of exclusive dealing, thus avoiding harsh per se disposi-
tions.159 A federal district court case puts the reason succinctly thus:
The Court is impressed by the argument of Defendant that, to hold that
a distributorship relationship is a tying product ...would render all
exclusive dealing arrangements per se illegal . . . without regard to the
unreasonableness or anticompetitive effect on the exclusive dealing in
contravention of the clear dictates of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
160
In Northern Pacific, the first certain Sherman Act § 1 per se tying case,
the Supreme Court said tying arrangements are per se condemned when
155. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., Inc., 3 TRIDE Ran. REP. 20,441 (FTC 1973).
156. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,105 (1969).
157. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The background is
a dictum in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), an
exclusive dealing case in which that practice was said to have considerable merit, but
tying practically none.
158. 388 U.S. at 386-88.
159. McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The Trouble With Tie-Ins,
58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085, 1091 (1970).
160. Refrigeration Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 711 (W.D. Tex.
1974). To go a step beyond this, any exclusive dealing involving two or more items
would be at no little hazard of being classed a per se tying. Colorado Pump & Supply
Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 640-41 (10th Cir. 1973). Also, exclusive dealings
run the risk of group boycott treatment, for these dealings, by agreement, exclude com-
peting suppliers, or competitors of the customer, or both. Consider the mutual exclusiv-
ity described in Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchison, Inc., 522 F.2d 1299, 1301
(5th Cir. 1975), involving the supplying of trade stamps to retailers.
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there is a conjunction of tying power and more than a de minimis restraint in
the tied item.161 Standard Oil Co. of California,'62 an earlier exclusive deal-
ing case in which tying is contrasted unfavorably with exclusive dealing, is the
source of most of the Northern Pacific attitude toward tying. Though there is
no convenient block of quotable language in Standard Oil with which the
point can be made in facile fashion, a fair reading of that case leads to the
conclusion that its limited rule of reason test16' is almost identical to what
Northern Pacific calls the per se test for tying. The additional inquiry in both
cases is concerned with economic power. Which should yield, the per se or
the rule of reason label? The latter seems to be a more accurate representa-
tion of what actually happens in both tying and exclusive dealing cases,
particularly as the federal courts have interpreted the requisite contents of
tying.
,In short, tying has so much merit that the lower federal courts have been
loath to accept that the Supreme Court has pronounced true per se condem-
nation. The lower courts' position, in fact, is supported by the equivocal
stance of the High Court itself.'0 4
To the cases already noted should be added three that further demonstrate
the undesirability of a hard per se line in tying situations. The events in
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,1 5 a 1960 case, occurred at a time
when the technology for installation and maintenance of community televi-
sion antennas was new and unfamiliar. The defendant Jerrold Electronics
Corp. had sold complete installations with the requirement that maintenance
service be performed by the defendant. As dictum the federal district court
said tying in that time period had been legal even though by the time of trial
the technology had become so established that it could no longer survive rule
of reason testing. The next year Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.0. Smith
Corp.'66 found reasonable the tying of a silo unloader mechanism to the sale
of a patented silo by reason of the history of failure of other manufacturers'
unloaders to give satisfactory service. Then, in a 1962 case, the First
Circuit in Baker v. Simmons Co.' 67 upheld a tie-in whereby the Simmons
Company required that motels displaying Simmons "Beautyrest" signs actu-
ally be equipped with Simmons Beautyrest mattresses. The tying was
upheld because it was actuated by legitimate business concern with the
Simmons reputation and good will, not the improper motive of increased
market control through the leverage of tying. Motive, however, can hardly
be put in issue without departing from the precincts of per se analysis.
161. 356 U.S. at 6.
162. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
163. Id. at 314. The economic power to which this statement relates is developed
in prior pages. Id. at 295-97. To put it mildly, this opinion is not distinguished by
clarity or consistency.
164. See notes 140, 141 supra and accompanying text. The problem is that the
Court's definition of tying permits, and has been taken by the lower courts to require,
very considerable evidence of economic power and effect.
165. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
ajj'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam).
166. 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
167. 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962).
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The Federal Trade Commission's position is consistent with these cases.
The Supreme Court in FTC v. Texaco, Inc.'68 upheld a Commission finding
of illegal tying within the meaning of Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)
by reason of Texaco's successful program of persuading its franchised service
station dealers to stock Goodrich tires, batteries, and accessories, all without
overt coercion whatever on the part of Texaco. Texaco had been receiving
a ten percent commission on Goodrich sales to Texaco franchised dealers.
The arrangement was found inherently coercive, but only in terms of a
record where Texaco's size and dominance, as well as the multi-million
dollar volumes of business involved, were developed. Despite Mr. Justice
Stewart's dissent denominating it so,'6 9 this is not a per se disposition unless
per se has ceased to be a term of legal art. Here the tie-in was placed and
then examined in its industry setting, including the power of the defendant
wielding the tie-in. This is rule of reason inquiry sufficiently pursued in the
case of this dominant and very powerful defendant. There is nothing in the
decision that would compel a like result for a much smaller and weaker
branded gasoline supplier. The key to the decision, as in the Sherman Act
exclusive dealing and tying cases, is a sufficient showing of real power to
support the finding of a coercive arrangement.
V. SOME CRITICISMS ADDRESSED TO THE CONVENTIONAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PER SE DISPOSITIONS
A 1975 Second Circuit case 170 identifies three possible justifications for
per se dispositions of Sherman Act § 1 allegations:
[T]hey are more certain than the rule of reason; they obviate the need
for elaborate and often fruitless evidentiary inquiries; and they reflect
an awareness that a court is not the best forum for making complex eco-
nomic judgments. 171
But, the court added:
[N]one of these are policies that has a great force in relation to the
rules of securities exchanges which are 'germane' to performance of the
duty of self-regulation . . . . Rather the rule of reason provides the
'breathing space' necessary for the process of supervised self-regulation
to work. 172
So, despite the fact that exchange regulation is notoriously one of the more
intricate economic areas, the easy per se route was not followed when to do
so would damage the primary objective of a viable system of conducting the
business under scrutiny. In his Topco dissent Chief Justice Burger, in the
context of the more mundane grocery business, made essentially the same
point when he indicated in criticism of the majority's extension of per se to
168. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
169. Id. at 232.
170. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
784, 46 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1976).
171. Id. at 1238.
172. Id. at 1239.
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horizontal territorial allocations that it seemed unjustified to take the per se
step in the teeth of an evidentiary record pointing the other way.178
Certainty of result, if for mere convenience of disposition in the courts, is
not a respectable reason for per se rules. Presumably this is why the Court
says it does not pronounce a new per se category until enough is known of
the challenged practice through prior rule of reason testings to condemn
it.174 A more logical explanation, however, is that the Court is both too
busy and inappropriate a forum to give contested business methods any
more economic scrutiny than is requisite for disposition of a particular
case. In fact, the Court has pronounced per se categories after only a
limited history of rule of reason testing in prior litigations. Witness the
price fixing per se in its direct aspect. That per se was pronounced only
nine years after what inescapably was an agreed price fix not only had been
tested by rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade,175 but also had so
emphatically passed the test that the opinion is the premier exposition of
what rule of reason testing is all about. Nothing in the initial 1927 per se
price fix opinion suggests that price fixing had been the subject of instructive
Court inquiries in those intervening nine years. To the contrary, Trenton
Potteries76 and the precedents on which it relies, all of which are prior to
Chicago Board of Trade, all wear the indicia of predilection and common
sense intuition, not the indicia of broad gauge economic study. The other
per se categories are no different. The conclusion is inescapable that the
certainty of result reason is, at best, mere convenience qua convenience,
without more.
To predetermine when evidentiary inquiry will be fruitless, the second
justification for per se dispositions, is rarely possible. The several per se
categories are riddled with exceptions because the federal district courts do
develop evidentiary records and do find sufficient merit to hold for defend-
ants. Coupled with the Supreme Court's inconsistent behavior in defining
and maintaining the per se categories it pronounces, these exceptions make
the evidentiary inquiry argument self-destruct.
Essentially the whole burden of justification must be carried, therefore, by
a claimed lack of economic expertise in the courts. There are several short,
telling responses to that. If there is a lack of expertise, how does the Court
ever gain the even greater expertise required to pronounce a per se rule and
thus preclude reasoned inquiry for all the future? And how is it that some
of the most difficult areas continue under rule of reason? Indeed, can one
seriously doubt that current rule of reason situations are more difficult to
analyze than current per se fact situations would be if left to rule of reason
testing?' 77 Per se may speed the rapidity of some case dispositions, but that
173. 405 U.S. at 614-15, 619-20, 622.
174. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
175. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
176. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
177. Consider, for example, the wedge driven between vertically imposed territorial
and customer restrictions according to whether title has passed or not. Are not analyses
of consignments, now assigned rule of reason testing, necessarily going to represent con-
siderably more onerous judicial tasks than would the same restrictions where title does
pass if that situation is also left to rule of reason? Inescapably, analyses of consign-
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is a high price to pay for damage to the maintenance of a sound competitive
system, an injury exemplified by the woodenly commanded result in the
Topco case. Moreover, efforts by skilled counsel to draft around the per se
categories must inevitably give rise to more complicated litigation just to
reach the point at which per se or rule of reason disposition will be
determined.
Inescapably, the Supreme Court is a collection of amateurs in the field of
economics, as are the lower courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
devised and compelled upon the lower courts some economic tests which are
far more intricate and difficult of application than those tests eliminated by
any per se category. Consider, for example, Clayton Act § 7,178 the anti-
merger statute which requires a prediction that the effect of a merger "may
be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." In
some degree this is a test laid on the courts by Congress, whether or not the
courts are qualified to apply it. But the intricate relevant market tests
exemplified in such decisions as United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,' 70 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 80 and United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank'8' are Court initiatives which betray an active willing-
ness, perhaps eagerness, to thrust the federal judiciary into extremely
complex economic analyses that certainly go far beyond anything Congress
could have intended.
A decision which demonstrates that the Court can be very immodest of
judicial branch economic attainments is United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.18 2 Despite the fact that competition necessarily was increased by a new
joint-ventured production facility in a geographic area where neither of the
two venturers theretofore had been a real competitive factor, the Court
refused in Penn-Olin to limit itself to making a decision on that basis. In-
stead, the Court compelled a test designed in terms of probabilities as to
whether either venturer would have gone solo with its own plant while the
other remained a potential competitor.' 83 This extremely abstruse and
sophisticated potential probability test has been further developed in FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp.,'84 a case in the related potential for reciprocal
dealing area. In that case the Court required the test be focused in terms of
the potential for reciprocal dealing as of the moment of merger, a require-
ments will be an onerous judicial task in such situations because the issue of whether
there is a bona fide consignment will be contested in addition to all else. Rule of reason
analysis will follow a consignment determination, while per se illegality will be
the fate of title passage situations. Yet the economic effects are probably more ad-
verse in the typical consignment situations because an ability to finance consignment
usually will mean greater economic strength in the supplier. Cf. Stan Togut Corp. v.
Hobart Mfg. Co., 398 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This consideration supports
Mr. Justice Stewart's criticism in the Schwinn case, notes 105, 107, 110 supra and ac-
companying text.
178. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 322, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). Section 7 is 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
179. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
180. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
181. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
182. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
183. Id. at 175-76; cf. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973);
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
184. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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ment which virtually disregarded what actually had transpired in the several
years before the merger was challenged. 185 These conjecture tests in terms
of market structure are at least as difficult as any area of economic
judgment. In addition, no statutory base beyond statutory authority that
tests be devised exists. 186 The record is one of willingness, even eagerness,
,to examine matters of great economic complexity-but only when the Court
is so inclined.
'Finally, is the field of economics so complex that an instructed amateur,
who has heard the testimony of "expert" economists, should hold himself
unqualified to hand down findings of fact and law relating to economic
issues? A column in the leading financial daily, pointing to the inability of
economic experts to agree upon even short range forecasts of future econom-
ic conditions, 87 recently reviewed expert forecasting performance by com-
paring the forecasts to what actually had transpired, concluding:
[T]he performance of most forecasters has been far from perfect, par-
ticularly in recent years. . . . A case in point is a survey of about three
dozen prominent forecasters, taken in late 1973. . . The great ma-
jority predicted that the economy would continue to expand in 1974.
In fact, as we painfully know, economic activity contracted sharply last
year.188
Short range forecasting is an area where economic expertise should be at its
best. A babel of voices,' 8 9 however, attends the predictions of economic
experts in judgment areas relating to antitrust. Unfortunately, the term
"expert" too often indicates a person with an inflexible commitment in
a particular subject area. For that reason, the expert often is less capable of
fair evaluation than is an intelligent amateur trier of fact who has undergone
185. Id. at 597-98. See also the concurring opinion, id. at 605-06. That the merging
company would hold down the performance of the acquired company becomes particu-
larly ridiculous when it is recognized that the merger is forever after subject to attack.
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596-607 (1957).
186. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-21 (1962). An exam-
ple of a complex area where the Court has continued to use rule of reason rather than
per se dispositions is the Sherman Act challenge to patent package licensing arrange-
ments when the package is not a simple "take it or leave it" offer. Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950).
187. Malabre, The Outlook, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
188. Id.
189. Consider the collection of materials in M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TRADE REGULATION 37-126 4th ed. (1967), and the diversity of attitudes revealed
in notes 3-6 supra. That there is a jungle of conflicting opinion as to the extent to
which economic theorizing should be permitted in an antitrust enforcement is well dem-
onstrated by the sharply conflicting positions in Bork, Bowman, Blake & Jones, The
Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965). See also
Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. REV. 413
(1964), particularly the telling comment by this economist, id. at 430-31, and A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 421-24 (1960). Can it
really be said the federal judiciary cannot deal with complex economic theory in the
light of such decisions as United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945); United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S.
521 (1954) (per curiam); or the very sophisticated concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581-604 (1967)? In a legal
system based on precedent the presence of a relatively few economically sophisticated
judges should be adequate, just as it is adequate to develop other subject areas of the
law. The reporting of case precedents multiplies judicial competence.
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evidentiary instruction. Let us be careful here. Amateur judgment, in
contrast to the judgment of an expert, has as much potential for correctness
and remains essentially a judgment without emotional or professional com-
mitment. The expert will persist in calling for one additional dose of his
medicine when the patient does not respond. The amateur, however, is
able, intellectually and without loss of face, to back away from an unsound
disposition which seemed sound but proved not, and to essay alternative solu-
tions.
VI. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Two further problems in the application of Sherman Act § 1 involve
extensive litigation which results in trial records considerably at war with the
intended simplicity and certainty of per se dispositions. The first is a type of
limitation which sometimes operates to shield as evident a per se situation as
direct price fixings from the reach of the Act. This limitation is based upon
the theory that there is a jurisdictional distinction according to whether
restraints of trade are "in commerce" or "affect commerce." The "in
commerce" situations are conclusively presumed jurisdictional. But those
affecting commerce, to be proscribed, must involve restraints which test out
as qualitatively or quantitatively more than insubstantial.190 The quantita-
tive test looks to the amount of economic value counters involved, typically
dollar totals; the qualitative test looks to whether the impact of the restraint
extends beyond essentially its local origin.19' A finding that there are
present the elements of either condition results in Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion.a92
The per se concept should be shorn of the unwarranted jurisdictional
limitations of this test. The Sherman Act long has been held to be a full
extension of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.'93 The
definitive holding for the ultimate reach of that power is the 19.42 case of
Wickard v. Filburn.19 4 That decision found the constitutional basis for
federal jurisdiction in growing a few bushels of grain on a small farm, for use
as animal feed where grown. The Court there held that even so minor and
local an activity, because it made it unnecessary for the producer to enter the
cash grain markets for his feed requirements, was enough to sustain federal
jurisdiction under the then-current federal agricultural adjustment act limit-
ing acreages of grain plantings.
190. United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953), involving
an agreement among all operators of drive-in theaters in Cook County, Illinois, fixing
admission prices, and Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa. 1975), in-
volving agreed prices for grocery store sale items are examples of this type of decision.
The latter case develops the distinction between "in commerce" situations, where juris-
diction is conclusively presumed, and "affecting commerce" situations, where it becomes
a question of fact whether wholly intrastate activities affect interstate commerce suffi-
ciently that Sherman Act jurisdiction should attach.
191. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 32, § 5.01[4][a].
192. "mhe case law clearly indicates that so long as the effect on interstate com-
merce of an alleged restraint is not both indirect and insubstantial, federal jurisdiction
will exist." Id. at 5-111.
193. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 538 (1944).
194. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.195 recently stated that the
economic test for Sherman Act jurisdiction only requires there be more than
de minimis values. 190 In two cases of the October 1974 term, Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. 197 and United States v. American Building
Maintenance Industries,'9" the Supreme Court was at pains to distinguish
the reach of the Sherman Act from that of the Clayton Act, pointing out the
Sherman Act is an "affecting commerce" statute which represents the full
extension of the constitutional powers of Congress under the Commerce
Clause, whereas the Clayton Act is an "in commerce" statute, more restric-
ed in its coverage. Can anyone seriously doubt that Congress has the power
to legislate Sherman Act coverage of a private economic activity having, say,
a ten thousand dollar impact upon a local economy in business contact with
a regional economy wider than the bounds of a single state? Although the
negative response seems clear, the Fourth Circuit en banc majority in Hospital
Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital'9 held that restraints upon the
provision of hospital services in a particular city were too local in impact to
draw Sherman Act jurisdiction, despite the fact there were interstate business
contacts and connections. The dissent viewed the matter differently: "Un-
der Gulf Oil, the test is one of congressional power, and the question is
whether Congress could reach the alleged conduct under the commerce
power . .. . [T]he majority opinion . . . [erroneously] applies a test ['in
commerce' rather than 'affecting commerce'] designed for determining the
jurisdictional ambit of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. ' 200 That
this dissent is essentially correct is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
1976 reversal of the Fourth Circuit,20 1 when a unanimous Court held that
though economic effects might be indirect because not "purposely directed"
toward interstate commerce, this did not limit Sherman Act jurisdiction.20 2
The definition of "substantial effect" also is stated in terms that suggest any
effort more than de minimis is substantial.20 3 Unfortunately, the Court did
not squarely so state. Thus, though the eventual outcome becomes increas-
ingly predictable, there remains the probability for yet more cases in the
federal trial courts that struggle with the false issue of whether the activity
classifies as interstate or intrastate in a sense supposedly obsolete in the case
of an "affecting commerce" statute since Wickard v. Filburn.
195. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). The ultimate confusion in this area is exemplified by
Sapp v. Jacobs, 408 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ill. 1976), where the opinion measures jurisdic-
tion by economic impact on a particular treble damage claimant. Id. at 131-32. Juris-
diction is, of course, the same for the United States and private persons.
196. 394 U.S. at 504.
197. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
198. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
199. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1976).
200. 511 F.2d at 687. See also St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n,
510 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1975). Query whether even this dissent improperly
shields from the Sherman Act intrastate activities having sufficient economic impact to
be more than de minimis. 511 F.2d at 689.
201. Hospital Supply Co. v, Trustees of Rex Hospital, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1976).
202. Id. at 1852, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 344.
203. Id. at 1853, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 344-45.
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The second area of jurisdictional limitations is concerned with the legisla-
tive grants of immunity to private persons and other entities, in addition to
which the Sherman Act structurally does not apply to acts of governments.
Express and implied exemptions from general antitrust laws have been
carved out by a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.20 4  Specific
exemptions such as the Capper-Volstead Act20 5 and the Webb-Pomerene
Act 208 allow associations of farmers ,and export associations to fix prices
where competition in the United States is not substantially affected. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act 20 7 defers to state regulation of insurance where
otherwise violations, including per se violations, might be found. There is
also the labor union exemption.208  An exemption is implied by reason of
the legal monopoly given owners of patents,209 and there is the political
exemption which stems from the right of persons to combine and petition
their governments for advantage, including selfish economic advantage, which
otherwise might be a violation. 210 Until 1976 the states were permitted to
authorize sellers in their jurisdictions to compel sales at agreed fair trade
prices.21l And the antitrust laws are not applicable against governments, in
consequence of which state action and state-compelled action are exempt. 212
As demonstrated in the cases cited in the footnotes to the preceding
paragraph, exemption from general antitrust coverage is grudgingly found.
When not found the dispositions of the general antitrust laws, including
204. These exemptions are discussed at much length in the majority and dissenting
opinions in United States v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), the
case itself being concerned with whether immunity from the general antitrust laws will
be implied for secondary offering of securities price fixings by reason of SEC regulation.
In it are noted situations of FPC, CAB, Maritime Commission, and national bank regu-
lation, with varying results. See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659(1975), decided the same day and concerned with the exemption of agreements fixing
brokerage commissions by reason of SEC powers to review and regulate. Somewhat dif-
ferent, but also to be noted, is an instance where the Supreme Court adheres to an ex-
emption which depends on a pre-1940 commerce clause interpretation which defined the
constitutional limits of federal jurisdiction before about 1940. Such an exemption con-
tinues to be allowed the business of major league baseball, despite that no other business-
organized spectator sport is permitted a like exemption. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972).
205. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970); Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970); FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
The boycott per se and acts of coercion and intimidation continue subject to the Sher-
man Act as before, however. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970).
208. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
209. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
210. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
211. The McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970); United States v. McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). This McGuire Act and its predecessor fair trade au-
thorization statute, the Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), were repealed by Pub.
L. No. 94-145 (March 11, 1976).
212. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Care must be taken if it is state com-
pelled, not merely state authorized action. It requires a special statute such as the Mc-
Guire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), before state permitted activities are legal. The dis-
tinction is discussed at some length in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773(1975). Fair trading was terminated effective March 11, 1976, by the repeal of the
McGuire Act and Miller-Tydings Act. Note 211 supra. The latest case in this in-
creasingly murky area is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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Sherman Act § 1 per se dispositions, are in order. Yet these cases make it
evident that the inquiry needed to test the validity of a claimed exemption
often will involve making a trial record of rule of reason proportions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The only Sherman Act § 1 per se which presently maintains an un-
breached line of authority is the new and difficult to justify horizontal
territorial allocation restriction articulated by the Supreme Court in its Topco
decision. 213 The other per se categories range from fairly firm per se
treatments to limited rule of reason inquiries masquerading under per se
labels. Even the price fixing per se, in its indirect phase, blurs into limited
rule of reason inquiry because it is necessary to identify whether it is in fact
a price fix, or something else. Also, the lower federal courts often permit
extensive economic inquiry in determining whether requisite "commerce" is
present for Sherman Act jurisdiction. Finally, tying seems to have devel-
oped an economic impact test even more demanding than this questionable
jurisdictional hurdle. Yet the elements of tying inquiry are supported in
very considerable degree by the Supreme Court's own formulation of it.
Despite the deviations mentioned in the previous paragraph, per se
concepts also frequently tend to be applied with such blind rigidity as to raise
concern that a per se, once established, forever after will be treated as set in
concrete. But if this wholly Court-developed method of disposition is to be
re-examined in any meaningful way, mechanisms must be found whereby
the Supreme Court obtains rather complete records of business setting and
economic impact from which it can determine whether it is justified to
continue to maintain a per se category, or even the concept itself. In short,
the per se concept presently is at war with any but rigidly applied, never-
changing stare decisis doctrine. This rule of prior decision is followed so
mindlessly nowhere else in our law, and so to apply it here is to choose what
is one of the least appropriate areas for the application. It is the constantly
changing kaleidoscope of local, regional, national, and international business
economies in which the Sherman Act operates. Can nine Justices ever be
wise enough to lock the economic future into straitjackets?
The tying per se, in particular, has demonstrated too much deviation in
terms of Supreme Court and lower federal court definitions to continue
pretending it is what it is not. But this most flawed per se, by reason
of its affinity to exclusive dealing, can become the vehicle for evolving away
from per se disposition while maintaining efficient means for disposing of
situations now in the per se categories. The procedures whereby this might
be accomplished will be developed in a subsequent Article.
213. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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